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This Article examines the Eli Lilly v. Canada arbitration award and its
potential impact on intellectual property-based investor-state dispute
settlements affecting pharmaceuticals. It begins by providing contextual
background on ISDS and the underlying Eli Lilly patent invalidations. It
then critiques the award and discusses the dangers of its overly cautious
grounds of decision and its explicit validation of IP-based ISDS. The
Article further illustrates these dangers through a discussion of the
stunning judicial reversal of the promise/utility doctrine by the Canadian
Supreme Court, the withdrawal of a compulsory licensing proposal in
Colombia, and the deregistration of a competing generic Hepatitis C
medicine in Ukraine. Ultimately, it recommends that ISDS provisions be
removed or rewritten to prevent the possibility of bringing IP-related
claims.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 2017, a three-member arbitration tribunal, instituted
pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)
Investment Chapter, delivered its investor-state dispute settlement
(“ISDS”) decision in Eli Lilly v. Canada,1 dismissing the pharmaceutical
giant’s claims and awarding CDN $5 million in costs and legal fees to the
Canadian government. After a five-year battle, with over CDN $15
million in attorney and expert-witness fees, Canada’s victory was hardly
“resounding,”2 given the deterrent effect of this and other intellectual
property-based investor-state arbitrations. But the eagerly awaited
decision, discussed at length in Section II, did effectively torpedo Eli
Lilly’s specific compensation claims. The Tribunal rejected Eli Lilly’s
arguments that Canada’s judicial revocations of two new-use
pharmaceutical patents had been confiscatory, unfair and inequitable, or
discriminatory. However, the Tribunal also failed to close the door to the
possibility that invalidation of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) under
domestic law could constitute a violation of international investment law
in the future.3 Nor did it question the possibility that domestic patent laws
1. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, (Mar. 16,
2017) [hereinafter Final Award].
2. Nathaniel Lipkus, Canada’s NAFTA victory a win for judicial sovereignty, POLICY OPTIONS
(Apr. 7, 2017), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/april-2017/canadas-nafta-victory-a-winfor-judicial-sovereignty/; accord Michael Geist, Panel Rejects Eli Lilly Claim Over Canadian
Patent Law, Orders Company to Pay Millions in Costs, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Mar. 21, 2017),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/03/panel-rejects-eli-lilly-claim-canadian-patent-law-orderscompany-pay-millions-costs/ (calling the tribunal decision “an enormous win”); Richard Gold,
NAFTA patent ruling a big victory for Canadian innovation, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/nafta-patent-ruling-a-bigvictory-for-canadian-innovation/article34617647/ (arguing that Canada was now free to design a
patent system that suits Canada’s needs and industry).
3. Brook K. Baker, Eli Lilly’s ISDS Claim against Canada Defeated, MADHYAM (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.madhyam.org.in/eli-lillys-isds-patent-claim-against-canada-defeated/ (arguing as well
that ISDS claims should not be permitted for IP related claims); Cynthia M. Ho, Inside Views:
TRIPS Flexibilities Under Threat From Investment Disputes: A Closer Look At Canada’s “Win”
Against Eli Lilly, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.ipwatch.org/2017/04/27/trips-flexibilities-threat-investment-disputes-closer-look-canadas-win-elililly/ [hereinafter Ho, Inside Views] (explaining the potential negative effects of the Eli Lilly case
outcome); Rob Howse, Eli Lilly v. Canada: A Pyrrhic Victory against Big Pharma, INT’L ECON.
& POLICY BLOG (Mar. 26, 2017), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/03/eli-lilly-vcanada-a-pyrrhic-victory-against-big-pharma-.html (criticizing the decision to leave the door open
to IP-based expropriation claims whenever social, economic, environmental, or other public policy
interests lead high courts to announce a fundamental reorientation of a country’s jurisprudence);
Howard Knopf, Canada Won the Eli Lilly NAFTA ISDS Battle Bigly but Who Will Win the War?,
EXCESS COPYRIGHT BLOG (May 1, 2017), http://excesscopyright.blogspot.com/2017/05/canadawon-eli-lilly-nafta-isds-battle.html (arguing that Canada made a fundamental mistake by not
raising the absence of a fundamental denial of justice as a jurisdictional challenge to Eli Lilly’s case
and instead merely arguing that domestic courts must be afforded “substantial deference,” leaving
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that are consistent with NAFTA or the World Trade Organization’s
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”)4 could nevertheless be impugned for disappointing corporate
expectations of profit under bilateral investment agreements.5
Accordingly, the claim, heralded by some, that the decision finally buries
lingering concerns that “trade tribunals will become supranational courts
of appeal over domestic property law disputes”6 is profoundly
misguided—it was at best a temporary, partial, or even pyrrhic7 victory.
Despite winning the ISDS battle, Canada has conceded the war. As
discussed in Section III, three months after Canada’s arbitral victory, the
Canadian Supreme Court dramatically loosened its long-standing
promise/utility doctrine in AstraZeneca Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.8
There, after a protracted pressure campaign from the United States and
the pharmaceutical industry, the Supreme Court of Canada eviscerated
the promise/utility doctrine, which required confirmatory evidence in the
patent application itself where the patent claim made a sound prediction
of utility, and adopted a much more forgiving test of utility that requires
only “a mere scintilla” of evidence.9 Section IV discusses the lingering
effect of the patentability-intellectual property claim in Eli Lilly on
Canada’s policy reversal that finds kinship in other intellectual propertybased ISDS cases involving a compulsory license in Colombia and data
exclusivity in Ukraine. Together, these three examples illustrate the
chilling effect of a toxic brew of private ISDS claims, relentless pressure
from trading partners, and a pharmaceutical industry bent on preserving
monopoly profits and intellectual property (“IP”) exclusivities.
Eli Lilly’s pending ISDS case received significant scholarly attention10
the door open to future ISDS challenges to IP rulings).
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
5. Ho, Inside Views, supra note 3 (explaining the potential negative effects of the Eli Lilly case
outcome).
6. Lipkus, supra note 2 (highlighting the positive aspects of the decision for Canada).
7. This description appears to have been first used by Howse, supra note 3, though it was Knopf,
supra note 3, who raised concerns about the risk of backtracking by the Canadian Supreme Court.
8. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 2017 SCC 36.
9. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 55.
10. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, ISDS, Intellectual Property Rights and Public
Health, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY
CHOICES, 189–99 (Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge eds., 2016) (explaining the effect of ISDS
provisions on legal rights); Jerome H. Reichman, Compliance of Canada’s Utility Doctrine with
International Minimum Standards of Patent Protection, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 108, 313 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014)
(examining the Eli Lilly case); Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound:
Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-
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and academic debate focused on the chaotic interface between IP and
trade-enforcement regimes and the ISDS regime, including their effect on
national sovereignty over public health and the public interest more
broadly.11 This Article’s focus, by contrast, is relatively narrow. It is not
Pacific Partnership Agreement 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9 (2015) [hereinafter Baker & Geddes,
Corporate Power Unbound] (discussing the dangers countries face when entering into trade
negotiations with higher-income countries); James Gathii & Cynthia M. Ho, Regime Shifting of IP
Lawmaking and Enforcement from the WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 427 (2017) (discussing how pharmaceutical industry disputes impact the WTO and
TRIPS regimes); Cynthia M. Ho, A Collision Course Between TRIPS Flexibilities and InvestorState Proceedings, 22 IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2016) [hereinafter Ho, Collision Course] (explaining
how companies like Eli Lilly are creating a new path for companies to sue companies for interfering
with their intellectual property rights); Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate
Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213 (2014)
[hereinafter, Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege] (examining the international impact of Eli Lilly’s
claim); Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121 (2014) (discussing the
substantial impact the Eli Lilly claim has on international intellectual property obligations);
Freedom-Kai Phillips, Promise Utility Doctrine and Compatibility Doctrine Under NAFTA:
Expropriation and Chapter 11 Considerations, 40 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 84 (2016) (exploring the
problems surrounding domestic patent standards, innovation, and investment standards unearthed
by the Eli Lilly claim); Valentina S. Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents,
Public Health and Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 113 (2015)
(discussing the intersection of intellectual property rights and international investment law and
arbitration); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights in Investor-State
Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation (U. Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal
Studies,
Working
Paper
No.
52/2014,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463711.
11. See, e.g., Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and
Intellectual
Property
Law,
19
J.
INT’L
ECON.
L.
145
(2016)
https://academic.oup.com/jiel/article/19/1/121/2357965/Interpreting-the-Overlap-of-International
(discussing how the objects and purposes of IP as an investment asset should be interpreted within
the framework of investment disputes on the basis of Vienna Convention rules); Gathii & Ho, supra
note 10 (arguing that regime shifting from the WTO to ISDS is deeply destabilizing to explicit and
implicit understandings of the balance of interests between producers and consumers of IP and to
the continuing adoption and use of TRIPS flexibilities); Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note
10 (arguing that IP-based ISDS claims, like Eli Lilly v. Canada, could disrupt internationally agreed
upon norms, allowing countries flexibility in their IP regimes once baseline TRIPS standards have
been met, and proposing specific language to incorporate in pending agreements to forestall such
harms); Ho, Collision Course, supra note 10 (arguing that IP-based ISDS claims may have a
chilling effect on countries that would otherwise use TRIPS flexibilities and recommending
changes to ISDS that would promote TRIPS flexibilities and sovereignty); Kathleen Liddell &
Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Judicial Patent Decisions, 19 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 145 (2016) (focusing on the growing tension between the fair and equitable treatment standard
in investment chapters and the interpretation of national patent laws by domestic courts); Tsai-yu
Lin, Inter-Mingling TRIPS Obligations with an FET Standard in Investor-State Arbitration: An
Emerging Challenge for WTO Law?, 50 J. WORLD TRADE 71 (2016) (noting the risk of fragmented
TRIPS interpretations in multiple arbitral awards adversely affecting the security and predictability
of the WTO dispute resolution system); Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?—
Intellectual Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International
Investment Agreements, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 252 (2015) (evaluating recent investor treaty
language for its sensitivity to public health and welfare concerns, finding some protective changes,
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indifferent to the cogent critiques of ISDS’s disruptive impact on WTO
TRIPS dispute settlement or settlement regimes established by other trade
agreements. Instead, it is primarily concerned with the second line of
critique that focuses on the negative impacts of IP-related ISDS claims
on the policy space that governments have to adopt, modify, and use
TRIPS flexibilities in order to prioritize public health and the right of
access to medicines for all.12 It focuses on the need to tame the excesses
of Big Pharma’s unbridled monopoly power and the industry’s intent to
expand its deterrent use of ISDS claims to intimidate governments into
acceding to its relentless pursuit of profits, irrespective of the cost to
but identifying problematic textual language as well); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Challenging
Compliance with International Intellectual Property Norms in Investor–State Dispute Settlement,
19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 241 (2016) (arguing that investment protection standards should not be
construed to allow invoking alleged breaches of international IP norms in ISDS and suggests
alternative mechanisms for aligning international IP and investment protections); Pratyush Nath
Upreti, Enforcing IPRs Through Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Paradigm Shift in Global IP
Practice, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 53 (2016) (noting the shift in IP enforcement to ISDS and expressing
concerns); Vadi, supra note 10 (arguing that ISDS arbitrators should not place excessive emphasis
on pharmaceutical patentees’ private interests but should instead pay adequate attention to the
public interests also embodied in IPRs); Sean Flynn, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens
Intellectual Property Limitations and Exceptions, INFOJUSTICE.ORG BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://infojustice.org/archives/34189 (arguing that adjudication of intellectual property violations
should be left to state-state arbitration).
There were earlier investigations of this area of law as well. See, e.g., Carlos A. Primo Braga &
Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct
Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163 (1998) (examining the ramifications of stronger
intellectual property rights on foreign direct investment); Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection
in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses,
26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331 (2004) (investigating international investment agreements); Christopher
Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect
Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357 (2010) (discussing the impact of compulsory licenses
on foreign direct investment); Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration:
Do International Investment Agreements Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Property
Rights?, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009–10 397 (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2010); Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights
in International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 871 (2012) (discussing intellectual
property rights in international investment agreements); Valentina Vadi, Mapping Uncharted
Waters: Intellectual Property Disputes with Public Health Elements in Investor State Arbitration,
2 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2009).
12. The 2001 Doha Declaration affirmed the rights of all WTO members to utilize the
flexibilities within TRIPS to promote public health objectives. Specifically, the Declaration stated:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment
to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we
reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001) [hereinafter TRIPS Declaration].
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consumer health.
The Article was originally intended to also counter the non-ISDS
offensive that has been waged against Canada’s legitimate adoption and
use of a TRIPS- and NAFTA-compliant promise/utility doctrine, one that
has been useful in weeding out unproven patents claiming new uses of
known medicines.13 In this regard, it is important to note that neither
industry nor the United States government have relinquished their
strident criticism of Canada’s patentability criterion, the promise/utility
doctrine. Eli Lilly,14 the Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufactures

13. Canada’s promise/utility doctrine was designed to prevent speculative over-patenting which
would dissuade innovation by pre-emptively fencing off areas of research in the absence of a
realized invention. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Statement
of Defence, ¶¶ 3–4 (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Statement of Defence].
14. A report of the outcome stated:
Eli Lilly said that it is “surprised and extremely disappointed” that the tribunal didn’t
recognize the “significant harm” caused by the promise utility doctrine, adding that the
decision sends a message that Canada has a “wide latitude to create an unfair playing
field for U.S. investments. We disagree with the tribunal’s conclusions and remain
concerned about Canada’s intellectual property regime, which increases investment risk
and adds unpredictability to the Canadian business environment for Lilly and the
innovative pharmaceutical industry,” the company continued in its statement.
Caroline Simson, Lilly, Biz Groups Rip Tribunal’s Decision on ‘Promise Doctrine’, LAW360
(Mar. 22, 2017, 8:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/904857?scroll=1.
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of America (“PhRMA”),15 and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce16 have
condemned the Eli Lilly award, and the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) has, for the fifth year in a row, criticized
Canada in its Special 301 Reports due to its promise/utility doctrine.17 In
15. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America reacted:
We are disappointed that the tribunal’s decision was made on narrow investment dispute
grounds and did not even address whether Canada’s “promise” doctrine is consistent
with NAFTA intellectual property rules. The patent utility or “promise” doctrine that
enabled Canada to expropriate Lilly’s patents continues to undermine Canada’s stated
goal of shifting to an innovation economy. Canada remains the only country in the world
that interprets patent utility in this manner, breaking the letter and spirit of its
international commitments on intellectual property rights.
Canada has used this discriminatory policy in 28 court decisions that invalidated 25
patents on 21 medicines over the last decade, targeting only pharmaceutical companies.
Canada’s actions have undermined patent protection and removed a critical incentive
that drives and sustains biopharmaceutical innovation. This policy also hurts Canadian
patients and the medical community. Since the institution of the promise doctrine the
number of clinical trials conducted in Canada has declined 21 percent.
If Canada truly plans to recognize the importance of innovation, and evolve from a
natural-resource based economy to one founded on science, innovation, and research,
either the Courts or Parliament must fix this backwards policy.
We know that Canada wants to, and can be, an innovation leader. Fixing this provision
will highlight Canada’s commitment to protecting intellectual property, demonstrating
that Prime Minister Trudeau’s Government is doing all it can to grow Canada’s
economy.
Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), PhRMA
Statement on NAFTA Tribunal Decision in the Eli Lilly Case (Mar. 21, 2017),
http://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-statement-on-nafta-tribunal-decision-in-the-eli-lillycase.
16. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce reacted:
This was a narrow decision that declined to rule on the legal merits of Canada’s
“promise” doctrine; it was not an endorsement of the doctrine’s policy. There can be no
dispute that the doctrine dramatically undermines legal certainty for medical innovators
in Canada: Since 2005, there has been a sharp increase in medical patent invalidation,
with 25 patents revoked that were previously approved by Health Canada and that were
being used to treat millions of patients around the world. These actions are outside
international norms and have undermined the stability that drugmakers rely on to
continue providing the kinds of cures the world needs. For these reasons, we urge the
Canadian government to address the stifling challenges the “promise” doctrine presents
for medical innovators in Canada.
Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Statement on Eli Lilly v. Canada Patent Ruling, (Mar.
21, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-statement-eli-lilly-vcanada-patent-ruling.
17. The USTR has listed Canada as a Priority Watch List Country for the last five years with
escalating and then repeated concerns expressed about Canada’s promise/utility doctrine. UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 46 (2013) (“With respect to
pharmaceuticals, the United States continues to have serious concerns about . . . the impact of the
heightened utility requirements for patents that Canadian courts have been adopting recently.”). As
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addition, the newly appointed USTR, Robert Lighthizer, indicated in a
hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means on June 22,
2017, that Canada’s promise/utility doctrine was a serious problem and
would be addressed as part of the U.S.’s renegotiation of NAFTA. 18
PhRMA has been strenuously lobbying the U.S. government with respect
to the pending renegotiation of NAFTA, focusing on the promise/utility
doctrine as well.19 Similarly, PhRMA’s 2017 Special 301 Submission
Report identified Canada’s “restrictive patentability criteria” as its first
issue of concern regarding Canadian IP standards.20 Parroting many of
the same arguments used by Eli Lilly, PhRMA claimed that Canada’s
also cited in the USTR’s 2014 Report:
The United States also has serious concerns about the lack of clarity and the impact of
the heightened utility requirements for patents that Canadian courts have applied
recently. Under this amorphous and evolving standard, courts can invalidate a patent on
utility grounds by construing the “promise of a patent” years after the patent has been
granted, leading to uncertainty for patent holders and applicants and undermining
incentives for investment in the pharmaceutical sector. In applying this standard, courts
have invalidated a number of patents held by U.S. pharmaceutical companies, finding
now that those products lack utility (i.e., not capable of industrial application), even
though such products have been in the market and benefiting patients for years.
United States Trade Representative, 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 49 (2014). As continued in 2015:
The United States also continues to have serious concerns about the lack of clarity and
the impact of the heightened utility requirements for patents that Canadian courts have
applied recently. In these cases, courts have invalidated several valuable patents held by
U.S. pharmaceutical companies on utility grounds, by interpreting the “promise” of the
patent and finding that insufficient information was provided in the application to
substantiate that promise. These recent decisions, which have affected products that have
been in the market and benefiting patients for years, have led to uncertainty for patent
holders and applicants, including with respect to how to effectively meet this standard.
This unpredictability also undermines incentives for investments in the pharmaceutical
sector.
United States Trade Representative, 2015 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 66 (2015). See also United States
Trade Representative, 2016 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 57 (2016) (reporting the same as noted in the
subsequent 2013, 2014, and 2015 reports); United States Trade Representative, 2017 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 62 (2017) (same).
18. U.S. Trade Policy, 02:32:02 (C-SPAN television broadcast June 22, 2017) https://www.cspan.org/video/?430344-1/us-trade-representative-robert-lighthizer-testifies-trumpadministration-agenda&live&start=9081 (featuring U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer
testifying before the House Ways & Means Committee on the Trump administration’s trade policy).
19. PhRMA said in recent comments to the USTR that contrary to NAFTA “and longstanding
international obligations and norms, the Canadian judiciary has created a new and heightened
standard for determining patent ‘utility,’” called the promise doctrine, which has led to twentyeight court decisions invalidating twenty-five biopharmaceutical patents for lack of utility since
2005. PhRMA urged the USTR to address this flaw in its renegotiation of NAFTA. See Letter from
Jay T. Taylor, PhRMA, to Edward Gresser, Chair of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, USTR
(June 12, 2017), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/PhRMA-Comments-on-NegotiatingObjectives-for-Modernization-of-NAFTA-June-2017.pdf.
20. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Special 301
Submission 2017 at 77 (2017), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/PhRMA-2017-Special301-Submission.pdf.
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“new and heightened requirement for patentable utility . . . has done great
damage to the patent rights of innovative pharmaceutical companies”21
and discriminated against pharmaceutical products.22 PhRMA members
urged the U.S. government to “press the Government of Canada to
resolve this issue through, for example, clarifying amendments to the
[Canadian] Patent Act” because this higher utility standard “is
fundamentally incompatible with the realities of pharmaceutical
development.”23
Regrettably, the Canadian Supreme Court has snatched defeat from the
jaws of Canada’s hollow arbitral victory. In a stunning reversal of policy,
the Supreme Court of Canada overturned its decades-old promise/utility
doctrine, making it easier for the biopharmaceutical industry to patent
medicines with only a “scintilla” of evidence that a medicine might
eventually prove to be useful24—“essentially a wink-wink rule that will
allow drug companies wide discretion to game the patent system to build
a thicket of patents around a base compound both to deter follow-on
innovation by competitors and to extend the effective term of patent
exclusivity well beyond the initial twenty-year term.”25 Rather than
granting patents based on proof of all claims of utility as of the time of
filing, patentees will be able to make minimally educated guesses on
possible future uses, even if those uses do not materialize.26 So long as
these guesses are not wholly “fanciful, speculative, or non-operable,”27
the reinterpreted utility test can be satisfied.
Equally problematic, since the initial filing of the Eli Lilly arbitration
claims, two other Big Pharma companies, Novartis and Gilead, have filed
or threatened to file ISDS claims against Colombia and Ukraine
respectively based on putative IP-investment rights. Unfortunately, those
cases did not result in favorable arbitral rulings—in both cases, the
countries were forced to reverse decisions that would have allowed
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
The Supreme Court of Canada held:
The Act does not prescribe the degree or quantum of usefulness required, or that every
potential use be realized—a scintilla of utility will do. A single use related to the nature
of the subject-matter is sufficient, and the utility must be established by either
demonstration or sound prediction as of the filing date.
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2017 SCC 36, ¶ 55.
25. Brook Baker, Canada Blinks in Face of US/Pharma Pressure – Supreme Court Adopts
Wink-Wink
Patent
Utility
Rule,
HEALTH GAP
BLOG
(July
1,
2017),
http://www.healthgap.org/canada_blinks_in_face_of_us_pharma_pressure_supreme_court_adopt
s_wink_wink_patent_utility_rule.
26. AstraZeneca Canada Inc., 2017 SCC 36, ¶ 55.
27. Id. at ¶ 57.
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generic competition and instead perpetuated the companies’ market
monopolies.28 Combined, the Canadian, Colombian, and Ukrainian
examples clearly demonstrate the escalating threat of IP-based
pharmaceutical ISDS claims to national sovereignty over patentability
criteria and the use of TRIPS-compliant public health flexibilities to
promote access to medicines for all.
After providing a brief contextual background on the Eli Lilly patent
invalidations and on ISDS in Section I, Section II of the Article details
the Eli Lilly arbitral award. Section III critiques the award, particularly its
overly cautious grounds of decision and its explicit validation of IP-based
ISDS. Those dangers are further discussed in Section IV based on the
stunning judicial reversal of the promise/utility doctrine by the Canadian
Supreme Court, on the withdrawal of a compulsory licensing proposal in
Colombia, and on the deregistration of a competing generic hepatitis C
medicine in Ukraine. The chilling effect of investor-state arbitration is
swiftly becoming more apparent.29
I. BACKGROUND TO ELI LILLY V. CANADA ISDS
In 1991 and 1996, Eli Lilly sought patents for new uses of two already
known compounds, olanzapine and atomoxetine, respectively. 30 The
grant of both patents by Canada’s Patents Office was only presumptively
valid, and was later challenged in the Federal Court by Eli Lilly’s
competitor, Novopharm Limited. Both patents were found invalid for
want of utility at the time of filing.31
Eli Lilly’s 1991 application for a further patent on olanzapine (eleven
years after its original patent was granted) claimed that the drug provided
superior treatment for schizophrenia compared with other members of the
same genus of compounds.32 This claim was made on the basis of studies
that failed to establish any particular treatment advantage over the
already-patented class to which olanzapine belonged.33 Accordingly, the
patent was invalidated by the Federal Court of Appeals34 and subsequent
appeals failed to overturn this ruling. Similarly, Eli Lilly’s 1996
application for a further patent on atomoxetine asserted a new use,
treatment of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), based on
an inconclusive preliminary study that was not disclosed in the patent
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See discussion infra Section IV.
See Gathii & Ho, supra note 10.
Baker & Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound, supra note 10, at 38–39.
Id.
Statement of Defence, supra note 13, at ¶ 3.
Id.
Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2011 FCA 220.
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application.35 This patent was also invalidated by the Federal Court, a
ruling that survived subsequent appeals.36
Each patent application filed by Eli Lilly was only one of multiple
applications made for each drug that claimed a variety of “new” uses for
each compound with little or no supporting evidence, ranging from sexual
dysfunction for olanzapine37 to hot flashes for atomoxetine.38 Most of
these applications were filed just prior to the expiration of Eli Lilly’s
original patents on the base compounds.39 The creation of so-called
patent thickets and fences—dense webs of overlapping patent rights that
competitors must hack through in order to commercialize new
technology—is a common strategy used by pharmaceutical firms to
insulate their products from generic competition and to extend the
effective period of exclusive rights. 40 In this case, Eli Lilly’s attempts to
extend its patent monopolies by claiming “new” uses of existing
compounds were obstructed by nine different Canadian judges who found
that Eli Lilly’s secondary, new-use patents were invalid for want of
utility.41
Free trade agreements (“FTAs”) and bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”) typically contain investment clauses designed to attract foreign
investment by offering protection against grossly unfair, confiscatory, or
discriminatory treatment.42 These clauses reassure foreign investors that
if their investments are unlawfully devalued by government action, they
can seek a remedy through state-state or investor-state dispute settlement
channels. Accordingly, investment clauses within FTAs and BITs
generally offer protection against: (1) violations of minimum standards
of treatment, that is, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security; (2) direct or indirect expropriation; and (3) violations of national
treatment and most-favored-nation principles, which require host
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Statement of Defence, supra note 13, at ¶ 4.
Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2012 FCA 232, aff’g 2011 FC 1288.
Statement of Defence supra note 13, at ¶ 67.
Id. at ¶ 55.
Id. at ¶¶ 53, 55, 67.
See generally BRONWYN HALL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF ECON. AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, A
STUDY OF PATENT THICKETS: FINAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICE (2012); Michael Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The AntiCommons Effect, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); C. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 J. INNOVATION POL. & ECON. 119 (2000);
Christian Sternitzke, Knowledge sources, patent protection, and commercialization of
pharmaceutical innovations, 39 RES. POL. 810 (2010); Christian Sternitzke, An exploratory
analysis of patent fencing in pharmaceuticals: The case of PCE5 inhibitors, 42 RES. POL. 542
(2013); Stu Woolman et al., Evidence of Patent Thickets in Complex Biopharmaceutical
Technologies, 53 IDEA 1 (2013).
41. Statement of Defence, supra note 13, at ¶ 52.
42. Baker & Geddes, supra note 10, at 12.
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governments to afford foreign investors treatment that is no less favorable
than that afforded to domestic entities in similar circumstances or no less
favorable than that afforded to investors from another state that has an
investment agreement with the host government.43 Initially used to
remedy banana-republic confiscations of foreign assets, investor-state
arbitration has increasingly been used by deep-pocketed foreign
corporations to challenge a broad array of government laws and policies
which adversely affect expected profits, including environmental and
land-use laws, government procurement decisions, and consumer
protection, public health, and public-safety laws.44 Broadly defined
“investments” protected by FTA investment chapters and BITs can
implicate IPRs, as IPRs typically require a commitment of capital or other
resources with the expectation of gain or profit. IPRs, such as patents,
which create an expectation of monopoly rents, therefore fall within the
standard definition of protected investments even when not expressly
included,45 as in NAFTA.46
On November 7, 2012, Eli Lilly filed a Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration seeking compensation for damages arising out of
Canada’s alleged violations of its investment obligations under NAFTA
Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation), Article 1105 (Minimum
Standard of Treatment) and Article 1102 (National Treatment).47 Eli
Lilly claimed damages not less than CDN $100 million. Seven months
later, Eli Lilly filed a new arbitration notice claiming no less than CDN
$500 million plus any payments Eli Lilly would be required to make
arising from the “improvident loss” of its Zyprexa and Strattera patents
or its inability to enforce those patents.48 Four years later, the Tribunal
found that the invalidation of Eli Lilly’s patents through application of
Canada’s well-established but evolving patent law could not form the
basis of an indirect expropriation claim under NAFTA Article 1110, nor
a claim for a violation of the minimum standard of treatment under
Article 1105, nor an arbitrary or discriminatory measure claim in

43. Baker & Geddes, supra note 10, at 12–13.
44. Id. at 17.
45. Id. at 31 (“Accordingly, unless IP rights are expressly excluded from the investment chapter
and from the definition of ‘investment,’ [IPRs] would be implicitly covered.”).
46. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, art. 1139, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
47. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, ¶ 87 (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Notice of
Intent to Submit a Claim].
48. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 85
(Sept. 12, 2013).
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violation of Articles 1110 or 1105.49
II. SUMMARY OF TRIBUNAL DECISION
The foundation for Eli Lilly’s claims was the invalidation of its
Canadian patents on two drugs, Strattera and Zyprexa, by Canadian
courts in 2010 and 2011 respectively, on the basis of inutility. According
to Eli Lilly, the basis for the judicial decisions was the adoption in the
mid-2000s of the “promise utility doctrine,” which it considered to be
“radically new, arbitrary and discriminatory against foreign
pharmaceutical companies and pharmaceutical products.”50 Eli Lilly
claimed that the promise/utility doctrine violated NAFTA Chapter
Seventeen, and that the retroactive application of the doctrine to its
patents resulted in the unlawful “expropriation” of its investments under
NAFTA Article 1110 and a breach of the minimum standards of
treatment under Article 1105.51 In addressing these claims, the Tribunal
focused on the following substantive questions:52
(a) Is denial of justice the only basis of liability for judicial measures
under NAFTA Chapter Eleven?
(b) Has there been a dramatic change in the utility requirement in
Canadian patent law?
(c) Is the utility requirement in Canadian patent law, as applied to the
Zyprexa and Strattera patents, arbitrary and/or discriminatory?
(d) If (b) and/or (c) is answered in the affirmative, did the invalidations
of the Zyprexa and Strattera patents breach Canada’s obligations
under NAFTA Article 1110 and/or Article 1105?53
A. Denial of Justice
According to the Final Award’s analysis, Eli Lilly claimed that the
“retroactive” application of the promise/utility doctrine to its patents
resulted in (i) the unlawful “expropriation” of its investments under
NAFTA Article 1110, and (ii) a breach of Canada’s obligation to provide
the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105.54 Eli Lilly
rejected the position that under international law the only possible theory
49. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 469.
50. Id. at ¶ 5.
51. Id.
52. As a threshold matter, the Tribunal considered and rejected Canada’s objection that the
complaint related to judicial developments that occurred before NAFTA’s three-year statute of
limitations period, noting that the limitations period ran from when the investor first acquired
knowledge of the alleged breach—in this case, when the two patents were invalidated. Id. at ¶¶
160–73.
53. Id. at ¶ 110.
54. Id. at ¶ 5.
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of liability for judicial measures is a denial of justice.55 It argued that
judicial measures can constitute an indirect expropriation under Article
1110, even in the absence of a denial of justice, where they violate an
international obligation and result in a substantial deprivation.56
Similarly, with respect to Article 1105, Eli Lilly claimed that “multiple
arbitral awards have confirmed that denial of justice is not the only
protection against judicial action offered by the minimum standard of
treatment.”57
With respect to Article 1110, Canada responded by asserting that a
denial of justice is the only basis on which a domestic court judgment on
the validity of a property right could constitute an expropriation.58 To
assert otherwise, Canada argued, would be to transform NAFTA Chapter
Eleven tribunals into “supranational courts of appeal in domestic property
law issues.”59 It argued further that international law on expropriation
requires first establishing the existence of a property right under domestic
law, and that Canadian courts had already found that Eli Lilly no longer
held property rights over Zyprexa and Strattera under Canadian law.60
Canada argued that Eli Lilly could not point to any examples of a judicial
expropriation in the absence of a denial of justice.61 With respect to
Article 1105, Canada argued that the only source of obligations therein is
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens,
and denial of justice is the only rule of customary international law
applicable to State organs exercising an adjudicative function.62
Accordingly, Eli Lilly had failed to state a claim under Article 1105 in
the absence of a denial of justice. The Tribunal noted that the United
States, in its submission, agreed that, unless there is a denial of justice,

55. Id. at ¶ 174. For a comprehensive discussion of the evolving and contested meanings of
denial of justice, see generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (discussing the evolution of “one of the oldest bases of liability” in
international law as applied in several modern landmark cases). See also Patrick Dumberry, Denial
of Justice under NAFTA Article 1105: A Review of 20 Years of Case Law, 32 ASA BULLETIN 2,
246–64 (June 2014) (discussing how NAFTA tribunals have interpreted and applied the
“exhaustion of local remedies” rule as well as the various tests put forward by them to determine
whether such a “denial of justice” has been committed).
56. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 181.
57. Id. at ¶ 183.
58. Id. at ¶ 188. This position was supported both by Mexico and the United States. Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Submission of Mexico Pursuant to NAFTA
Article 1128, ¶¶ 12–14, 19–21 (Mar. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Mexico Submission]; Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Gov’t of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Submission of United States of America Pursuant
to NAFTA Article 1128, ¶¶ 20–37 (Mar. 18, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. Submission].
59. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 190.
60. Id. at ¶ 191.
61. Id. at ¶ 195.
62. Id. at ¶ 196.
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international tribunals should defer to domestic courts interpreting
matters of domestic law.63 The United States submitted that decisions of
domestic courts do not give rise to a claim for expropriation under Article
1110.64 Similarly, the United States submitted that judicial measures
could form the basis of a claim under Article 1105 only if a denial of
justice was proven. Otherwise, “Chapter Eleven tribunals would become
supranational appellate courts on the application of substantive domestic
law.”65
The Tribunal disagreed with Canada, expressing its unwillingness to
“shut the door to the possibility that judicial conduct characterized other
than as a denial of justice may engage a respondent’s obligations under
NAFTA Article 1105.”66 The Tribunal reasoned that conduct not
amounting to a denial of justice may nevertheless be “sufficiently
egregious and shocking” as to violate the minimum standard of treatment
required by Article 1105.67 The Tribunal also cited the definition of
minimum standard of treatment applied in Glamis Gold v. United States,
which includes “manifest arbitrariness” and “blatant unfairness”
alongside “gross denial of justice.”68 Similarly, the Tribunal refused to
narrow the scope of inquiry of judicial decisions under Article 1110 to
circumstances of a denial of justice. It argued that “it is possible to
contemplate circumstances in which a judicial act (or omission) may
engage questions of expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110, such as,
perhaps, in circumstances in which a judicial decision crystallizes a
taking alleged to be contrary to NAFTA Article 1110.”69
However, the Tribunal reiterated earlier comments that “a NAFTA
Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier in respect of the decisions
of national judiciaries”70 and emphasized the importance of according
“considerable deference” to the conduct and decisions of domestic courts.
It explained that it would “only be in very exceptional circumstances, in
which there is clear evidence of egregious and shocking conduct, that it
will be appropriate for a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal to assess such

63. Id. at ¶ 204.
64. Id. at ¶ 206.
65. Id. at ¶ 208 (summarizing the United States’ position regarding NAFTA Article 1105).
66. Id. at ¶ 223.
67. Id.
68. Id. at ¶ 222 (accepting a minimum standard of treatment with respect to denial of justice
involving “an act that is sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a
manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall below accepted international standards and constitute a
breach of Article 1105”).
69. Id. at ¶ 221.
70. Id.
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conduct against the obligations of the respondent State under NAFTA
Article 1105(1).”71 Despite making this arbitral dictum, the Tribunal
ruled that it did not need to reach any final decision on the denial of justice
limits of liability of a respondent state because the Tribunal saw no breach
of NAFTA at all on the facts of the case.72 In this particular case, the
Tribunal argued, the factual predicate of egregious or shocking conduct
that would be necessary to sustain Eli Lilly’s claim of a breach of Article
1105(1) and/or Article 1110 had not been established. In other words, Eli
Lilly’s case did not meet “the threshold requirement to proceed under this
head.”73
It is also important to note that NAFTA Article 1110(7) explicitly
states that Article 1110 “does not apply to the issuance of compulsory
licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the
revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the
extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent
with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property).” Canada argued that the
judicial invalidation of Eli Lilly’s patents was wholly consistent with
Chapter Seventeen: “[w]here a court of competent jurisdiction, applying
full due process and reaching a decision pursuant to its mandate,
determines that a presumed property right is legally invalid . . . this does
not amount to a “taking,” but rather, constitutes juridical determination
of the existence and scope of rights at law.”74 NAFTA Article 1110(7),
Canada argued, was “intended to provide, in the intellectual property
context, a further “defence” for the NAFTA Parties against claims of
expropriation. This reflected the prominent role of sovereign parties in
the regulation and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and
consequent risk that such State action might give rise to claims under the
expropriation article. Accordingly, the NAFTA Parties provided that
Article 1110 would not even apply to determinations in this context, so
long as the measure at issue was “consistent with Chapter Seventeen.”75
The Tribunal did not read this provision to unduly restrict its inquiry.
Moreover, it ignored a more fundamental argument that the Tribunal
lacked competence to assess whether Chapter Seventeen IP violations
had occurred or whether such violations would be per se violations of the
investment chapter, positions advanced by Canada and supported by both

71. Id. at ¶ 224 (specifying the Chapter Eleven tribunal’s reviewal role).
72. Id. at ¶ 220.
73. Id. at ¶ 226.
74. Statement of Defence, supra note 13, at ¶ 108 (discussing Canada’s promise/utility doctrine
and its potential to chill innovation in the form of speculative over-patenting).
75. Id. at ¶ 114.
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the United States and Mexico.76
B. The Promise/Utility Doctrine
With respect to the second question, Eli Lilly claimed that the
promise/utility doctrine represents a “radical departure” both from
Canada’s traditional utility standard and the utility standards applied by
Canada’s NAFTA partners, the United States and Mexico.77 It claimed
that the “elevated requirement for utility” imposed by the promise/utility
doctrine reflects a “stark divergence” between patentability requirements
in Canada and in other NAFTA parties, making Canada an “outlier.”78
Based on existing Canadian law, Eli Lilly argued that it held, and
reasonably relied on, “legitimate expectations” that its patents would not
be invalidated on the basis of a “radically new utility requirement.”79 Eli
Lilly claimed that the initial grant of the Zyprexa and Strattera patents
represented a “commitment” by Canada that Eli Lilly “would have
exclusive rights to make, use, and sell its invention until the expiry of the
patents”80 notwithstanding the common knowledge that patents are
temporary rights vulnerable to judicial invalidation at any time.
Unusually, Eli Lilly seemed to hinge its claim on the scope of perceived
change in Canadian law, careful to distinguish between what it described
as an “acceptable margin of change” (measured change in the law or
clarification of previously unsettled law) and “the adoption of a
completely new doctrine in a well-settled area.”81 The ability of a foreign
company to dictate the “permissible” scope of change in domestic law of
a sovereign nation illustrates the disquieting precedent set by investorstate arbitration of domestic judicial decisions.
Canada’s response was two-fold: first, it defended the promise/utility
doctrine as a long-standing component of Canadian patent law, arguing
that it existed “long before Claimant filed its patents or NAFTA entered
into force.”82 Second, it argued that even if the promise/utility doctrine
76. Id. at ¶¶ 82–94; Mexico Submission, supra note 58, at ¶¶ 22–31 (noting that a domestic
court judgment on the validity of a property right is only an expropriation if justice is denied); U.S.
Submission, supra note 58, ¶¶ 32–37 (agreeing with the assertion of the Mexico Submission).
77. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 227 (holding that Eli Lilly lost to Canada in an ISDS
challenge).
78. Id. at ¶¶ 236, 258, 259.
79. Id. at ¶¶ 261, 263.
80. Id. at ¶ 264.
81. Id. at ¶ 269.
82. Id. at ¶ 274. For an extended discussion of the promise doctrine and its equivalency with
patent standards in other Commonwealth countries, see generally E. Richard Gold & Michael
Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World, 30 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
35 (2014). For Gold’s newly contrary view that the “promise doctrine” was made up by Eli Lilly
as a straw man for its ISDS case, see E. Richard Gold, Eli Lilly’s Odyssey to Use a Fake Rule and
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could be construed as a legal shift, it defended its right to jurisprudential
development: “[I]t is trite to say that the common law evolves over time.
Any sophisticated investor expects developments in the law, particularly
in the area of patent law. It simply cannot be that every time a court
overrules a precedent, it violates customary international law.” 83 With
respect to Eli Lilly’s “legitimate expectations” that its patents would not
be invalidated, Canada argued that the initial grant of a patent cannot
constitute the basis for legitimate expectations because “patents issued by
the Patent Office are only presumptively valid, subject to challenge and
to final determination by the judiciary.” 84 In other words, when Eli Lilly
filed the Strattera and Zyprexa patents, “it knew, or should have known,
that its patents could be invalidated if they did not satisfy the applicable
patentability requirements, and that the legal meaning of patentability
requirements is constantly being clarified and elaborated through court
decisions.”85 Finally, with respect to allegations that the promise/utility
doctrine also represents a radical departure from the patentability
standards of other NAFTA parties, Canada argued that “any differences
in patent law regimes across jurisdictions [is] irrelevant,
as . . . international patent law is not harmonized by NAFTA or
otherwise.”86
Rather than firmly defend Canada’s right to jurisprudential
development, the Tribunal concluded that Eli Lilly had not adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that Canadian patent utility law had
undergone a dramatic transformation.87 The Tribunal did, however,
highlight the unreasonableness of Eli Lilly’s assumption that common
law decisions should occur “in a reasonably foreseeable and predictable
channel, without significant or material changes.”88 Rather, the Tribunal
explained that, in common law jurisdictions, “evolution of the law
Fake
News
to
Protect
Bad
Patents,
STAT NEWS
(Aug.
16,
2017),
https://www.statnews.com/2017/08/16/eli-lilly-canada-patents-zyprexa-strattera/ (alleging that Eli
Lilly invented the promise doctrine by weaving together poorly contextualized statements and
baseless allegations of past violations).
83. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 306 (quoting Canada’s Response Post-Hearing Memorial).
84. Id. at ¶ 302.
85. Id. at ¶ 303.
86. Id. at ¶ 297. NAFTA Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property) contains built-in flexibility
with respect to the domestic implementation of its provisions. Statement of Defence, supra note
13, at ¶ 115. Specifically, Article 1702 states: “A Party may implement in its domestic law more
extensive protection of intellectual property rights than is required under this Agreement, provided
that such protection is not inconsistent with this Agreement.” NAFTA, supra note 46, at ch. 17, art.
1702. At no point does the text of NAFTA require all signatory parties to implement carbon-copy
intellectual property provisions. Statement of Defence, supra note 13, at ¶ 115.
87. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 308 (finding that Eli Lilly had not met its burden in
establishing the utility requirement under Canadian patent law).
88. Id. at ¶ 310.
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through court decisions is natural, and departures from precedent are to
be expected.”89 Since Eli Lilly had failed to demonstrate a dramatic
change in Canadian law, the Tribunal dismissed its allegation of a
violation of its legitimate expectations.90
In reaching this decision, the Tribunal assessed the three principal
elements of the promise/utility doctrine: (1) the identification of a
promise of utility in the patent application; (2) the prohibition against use
of post-filing evidence to prove utility as of the time of filing; and (3) a
requirement to include evidence demonstrating sound prediction of utility
in the application itself.91 Reviewing the first element, the Tribunal found
that the requirement of identifying a promise of utility in the patent
application had long existed in Canadian patent law, even if it had not
previously played a significant role.92 Although the Tribunal found that
the second element concerning post-filing evidence was “unexpected,”
the reversal of lower court opinions was a natural feature of a “tiered
judicial system” that included the reasonable reconciliation of various
cases in a manner “not entirely inconsistent.”93 As to the third element,
requiring a sound prediction of utility, Eli Lilly had had a patent
application rejected on this ground in 2003 and its own lawyers had
issued a client update on the issue after another court decision in 2009,
reporting that the court had therein “reiterated” the test from earlier
cases.94
Eli Lilly’s assumption that its patents would not be invalidated did not,
according to the Tribunal, constitute a legitimate expectation because at
the time it made its investments “it was aware that Canadian patent law
required patented inventions to be useful” and “each of the three elements
of the alleged promise utility doctrine had a foundation in Canadian law
when [its] patents were filed.”95 Accordingly, at that time, although Eli
Lilly “may not have been able to predict the precise trajectory of the law
on utility, it should have, and could have, anticipated that the law would
change over time as a function of judicial decision-making.”96 The
Tribunal concluded that, between the time that the Zyprexa and Strattera
patents were granted and subsequently invalidated, Canada’s utility
requirement underwent “incremental and evolutionary changes” rather
89. Id.
90. Id. at ¶ 380.
91. Id. at ¶ 313.
92. Id. at ¶¶ 316–25.
93. Id. at ¶¶ 326–37 (analyzing the second element of the promise/utility doctrine).
94. Id. at ¶¶ 338–50 (discussing whether the basis of sound prediction must be disclosed in the
patent, based on the 2008 Raloxifene Decision).
95. Id. at ¶ 384.
96. Id. at ¶¶ 383–84.
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than a “fundamental or dramatic change.” Accordingly, Eli Lilly failed to
prove that its “legitimate” expectations were violated by the application
of Canadian patent law to its patents for Zyprexa and Strattera even if
legitimate expectations were considered to be part of NAFTA’s minimum
standards of treatment.97
The Tribunal refused, however, to determine the “contentious legal
question of whether a violation of an investor’s legitimate expectations
can constitute a breach of NAFTA Article 1105,” thereby leaving the
door open to this possibility.98
C. An Arbitrary and Discriminatory Measure
Next, the Tribunal addressed the question of whether the
promise/utility doctrine was an arbitrary or discriminatory measure, as
alleged by Eli Lilly, within the meaning of NAFTA Articles 1105 and/or
1110. Eli Lilly claimed that the promise/utility doctrine was “arbitrary”
because it was “unpredictable,” “incoherent,” and “serves no legitimate
public purpose.”99 Additionally, Eli Lilly claimed that the promise/utility
doctrine “discriminates against pharmaceutical patents as a field of
technology” in violation of NAFTA Article 1709(7).100 Eli Lilly also
claimed that the promise/utility doctrine discriminates against foreign
pharmaceutical companies to the benefit of Canada’s generic drug
industry: “[O]nly patents held by foreign firms have been invalidated
pursuant to this doctrine.”101
Canada rejected the arbitrariness claim, arguing that patent
interpretation is not “arbitrary,” but based on long-standing principles of
construction;102 the ban on post-filing evidence is not “arbitrary,” but
designed to prevent speculative patenting;103 and requiring patentees to
disclose the basis of their sound predictions is also not “arbitrary,” but
instead represents the basic quid pro quo that applicants offer in exchange
for patent exclusivities.104 In addition, Canada argued that Eli Lilly had
97. Id. at ¶¶ 386–87. Changes between the 1990 and 2009 Manual of Patent Office Practice
were not authoritative evidence of the prior state of Canada’s patent law. Id. at ¶¶ 352–66. Similarly,
Eli Lilly’s statistical arguments addressing the number of patents invalidated after 2005 were
unconvincing. Id. at ¶¶ 367–76 (charting statistical evidence relevant to the claim).
98. Id. at ¶ 381.
99. Id. at ¶ 390.
100. Id. at ¶ 397. Eli Lilly claimed that more than two dozen pharmaceutical patents had been
invalidated pursuant to the promise/utility doctrine since 2005. Id. at ¶ 398.b.
101. Id. at ¶ 401.
102. Id. at ¶ 403 (explaining that this includes the principal that the patent should be construed
as a whole (i.e., both disclosure and claims)).
103. Id. at ¶ 406 (summarizing Canada’s response to Eli Lilly’s “criticism of the ban on postfiling evidence”).
104. Id. at ¶ 407.
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failed to provide any statistically significant evidence of either de jure or
de facto discrimination against pharmaceutical patents.105 Its data
analysis revealed several flaws, including a fundamental
misunderstanding of correlation and causation, and ignorance of the
multiplicity of factors that affect litigation outcomes. 106 Finally, contrary
to Eli Lilly’s claim that foreign pharmaceutical firms face discrimination,
Canada pointed out that domestic firms are subject to the same
promise/utility doctrine as Eli Lilly.107
Before addressing the allegations made against the promise/utility
doctrine, the Tribunal clarified that it did not regard the judicial
invalidations of the Zyprexa and Strattera patents to be arbitrary or
discriminatory:
The patent grants to [Eli Lilly] were made in a legal system that
historically has, and necessarily, evolves, and this evolution resulted in
later decisions, rationally and not unforeseeably, that concluded the
initial patent grants were invalid, just as the Canadian statutory patent
regime envisions. As such, the challenged decisions of the Canadian
courts cannot constitute either a breach of NAFTA Articles 1105 or
1110.108

With respect to the separate claim that the promise doctrine itself is
arbitrary and discriminatory, the Tribunal concluded that Canada’s
patentability requirements were “the consequence of a rational policy
approach in Canada, not an indication of arbitrariness in the law,”109 and
that Eli Lilly’s expectations of predictability and certainty revealed a
profound misunderstanding of the reality of common law.110 Importantly,
the Tribunal emphasized, more than once, that “it is not the role of a
NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal to question the policy choices of a
NAFTA Party.”111 The Tribunal reasoned that some degree of
unpredictability was to be expected in the application of any law,112 and
that the promise/utility doctrine had a sufficient and rational connection
to a legitimate public policy “that ‘the public receives its end of the patent
bargain’ (particularly but not solely in connection with ‘new use’ and
‘selection’ patents), and that ‘it encourages accuracy while discouraging
105. Id. at ¶ 410.
106. Id. at ¶¶ 413–14 (noting that out of the 25,760 pharmaceutical patents granted between
1980 and 2013, only 134 validity challenges were decided).
107. Id. at ¶ 415.
108. Id. at ¶ 418.
109. Id. at ¶ 426 (discussing the Tribunal’s understanding of “the difficulty for companies in
innovative industries described by [Eli Lilly]”).
110. Id. at ¶¶ 421, 429.
111. Id. at ¶¶ 426, 430.
112. Id. at ¶ 421 (further noting that inconsistency in judicial interpretation at this limited scale
is to be expected).
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overstatement in patent disclosures.’”113 With respect to the second
element barring use of post-filing evidence, it was a bright-line rule
connected to the valid public policy of preventing speculative patents.114
Although the application of the third element was less precise, this too
was not problematic because imprecision “abound[s] in nearly all legal
regimes.”115
Concerning allegations of de facto discrimination against
pharmaceutical patents as a field of technology, the Tribunal found that
Eli Lilly had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish a causal link
between the promise/utility doctrine and higher invalidity rates in the
pharmaceutical sector.116 The Tribunal could not “rule out the possibility
that alternative factors [other than the promise/utility doctrine] may give
rise or contribute to the difference in rates of inutility finding.” 117
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Eli Lilly failed to prove its
allegation that the promise/utility doctrine discriminates against
pharmaceutical patents.118
Finally, addressing allegations of discrimination based on nationality,
the Tribunal noted:
[Eli Lilly] has not made much effort to fully develop this theory of de
facto nationality-based discrimination. The only facts [Eli Lilly] has
come close to establishing are: (i) since 1 January 2005, the
pharmaceutical patents invalidated on the ground of inutility (whether
through the application of the promise utility doctrine or not) have been
held by foreign pharmaceutical companies, and (ii) the largest
pharmaceutical companies in the world are not Canadian. The Tribunal
will not infer discrimination from such a bare record. [Eli Lilly] has
wholly failed to demonstrate that the promise utility doctrine
discriminates against foreign patent holders.119

The Tribunal concluded that Eli Lilly had failed to establish the factual
premise on which its allegations of arbitrariness and discrimination were
based, and that, in the circumstances of this case, “the evolution of the

113. Id. at ¶ 423 (explaining that the Tribunal need not determine whether the promise doctrine
is the only or best means of achieving the relevant public policy objectives, but solely whether the
promise doctrine is rationally connected to these objectives).
114. Id. at ¶¶ 424–25 (arguing that all patent regimes must determine the line between
speculation and invention, and there is no perfect way to draw this line, but it does not seem
arbitrary to select the patent application’s filing date).
115. Id. at ¶ 429 (determining that if Eli Lilly’s argument applied, “the concept of arbitrariness
would lose all meaning”).
116. Id. at ¶ 433.
117. Id. at ¶ 435 (noting as an example that the patenting practices of pharmaceutical companies
may result in patents more susceptible to utility challenges).
118. Id. at ¶ 439.
119. Id. at ¶ 441.
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Canadian legal framework relating to [Eli Lilly’s] patents cannot sustain
a claim of arbitrariness or discrimination going to a violation of NAFTA
Articles 1105(1) or 1110(1).”120
Based on the “loser pays” principle enshrined in Article 40(1) of the
UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribunal determined that Eli Lilly would bear the
costs of the arbitration, including 75 percent of Canada’s arbitration and
legal fees amounting to CDN $6.5 million; the Tribunal Members’ fees
and expenses and ICSID’s fees amounting to USD $749,697; and Eli
Lilly’s own legal fees exceeding USD $7.8 million.121
III. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITIQUES OF THE FINAL AWARD
Despite Canada’s ultimately successful defense, the Tribunal’s
judgment was disappointing in several respects. First, the Tribunal stated
that a judicial decision could form the basis of an investment claim
without any denial of justice in exceptional circumstances of egregious
and shocking conduct—in essence, judicial decisions are entitled to no
more than considerable deference.122 Specifically, although it found that
the invalidation of the Zyprexa and Strattera patents through application
of the promise/utility doctrine “cannot form the basis of an expropriation
claim under NAFTA Article 1110 or a claim for a violation of the
minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA Article 1105,”123 the
Tribunal did not rule out the possibility of other judicial decisions
forming the basis for such claims in the future. The Tribunal specifically
confined its judgment to the circumstances of the Eli Lilly case and
expressly refused to close the door on non-denial of justice claims. In
doing so, the Tribunal “rejected important protection for state
sovereignty” and had “no qualms about saying that an investor can attack
decisions of a country’s judiciary about the meaning of its own law even
in the absence of a denial of justice—thus allowing the investor to do an
end run around the requirement of finality. . . .”124
Mere deference, instead of absolute judicial sovereignty over
interpretation of national law, is made even more problematic by the
120. Id. at ¶ 442.
121. Id. at ¶ 459 (summarizing the Tribunal’s findings on legal fees and reimbursement).
122. See Ho, Inside Views, supra note 3 (detailing concerns about Canada’s “win” and
analyzing the effect of such decisions on investor-state tribunals such as NAFTA); Knopf, supra
note 3 (arguing that Canada made a fundamental mistake by not raising the absence of a
fundamental denial of justice as a jurisdictional challenge to Eli Lilly’s case and instead merely
arguing that domestic courts must be afforded “substantial deference,” leaving the door open to
future ISDS challenges to IP rulings); Howse, supra note 3 (calling deference a dangerous and
“much too polite” standard).
123. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 469 (dismissing Eli Lilly’s claims without further inquiry).
124. Howse, supra note 3 (calling deference a dangerous and “much too polite” standard).
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Tribunal’s assertion that judicial interpretation should progress in an
incremental and predictable manner.125 Dramatic, fundamental, or radical
changes—whether accomplished by judicial interpretation or legislative
or regulatory action—are highly suspect, however well-grounded in
rationality, changed circumstances, or evolving public interests they may
be. In this way, IP investors’ frustrated expectations of regulatory stasis
could lead to claims designed either to protect existing pro-IP rules or to
impugn rules that better address consumer interests, including access to
more affordable medicines.
Secondly, the Tribunal considered Eli Lilly’s criticism of the
“uniqueness” of Canada’s law (relative to other jurisdictions) as a valid
argument, notwithstanding the domestic flexibilities provided by
NAFTA.126 The Tribunal cited the statement, found in the 2014 and 2015
editions of the Special 301 Report of the U.S. Trade Representative, that
the United States had “serious concerns about the lack of clarity and the
impact of the heightened utility requirements for patents that Canadian
courts have applied recently.”127 Rather than dismiss these claims for
irrelevance, the Tribunal dismissed them for insufficiency, arguing that
the silence of other countries “speaks louder than the single, brief
criticism contained in the USTR’s Special 301 Report.”128 The
implication herein, that similar criticisms received from additional parties
would have swayed the Tribunal’s judgment as to the “appropriateness”
of allowing Canada to determine its own patentability laws, dishonors
long-standing national sovereignty over domestic public health policy.
The Tribunal seemed to forget the discretion afforded to sovereign
nations by TRIPS to “determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of [TRIPS] within their own legal system and practice.”129
It is now well understood that neither NAFTA nor TRIPS established
highly specified criteria for patentability. 130 Indeed, the references to
novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability are largely
unembellished except to recognize the U.S.’s less stringent requirements
125. See id. (arguing that the Tribunal’s decision may encourage future regulatory takings
claims “by implication that the concept of ‘expropriation’ under NAFTA” may require the state to
compensate an investor for dramatic, radical, or fundamental “jurisprudential shifts in the approach
of a country’s highest courts to that country’s law”).
126. See Ho, Inside Views, supra note 3 (noting that the Tribunal considered it relevant, “despite
the fact that among the three NAFTA countries, only the U.S. suggested in a single report that
Canada’s law was a problem”) (emphasis added).
127. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 378.
128. Id.
129. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 1.1.
130. For a comprehensive overview of flexibility in international patent law, see generally Sarah
R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 153
(2014).
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of non-obviousness and usefulness.131 There is indeed an enormous
degree of heterogeneity and plasticity in statutory patentability criteria
and jurisprudence internationally. TRIPS may well establish a very
loosely defined harmonized minimum, but it also allows countries to have
very stringent standards, as in India, or very lax standards, as in the
United States, where hundreds of “evergreening,” secondary patents that
extend effective periods of patent exclusivity are granted every year
based on minor changes in the chemical entity, formulations, dosages,
and uses.132
Canada’s domestic implementation of the “industrial applicability”
requirement through the promise/utility doctrine falls well within the
bounds of both NAFTA and TRIPS. Yet the Tribunal failed to
acknowledge sovereign discretion over domestic implementation of
international IP law, instead entertaining Eli Lilly’s criticism of Canadian
singularity. In addition to ignoring the flexibility in patentability criteria
provided by TRIPS, the Tribunal also failed to mention that “NAFTA
does not impose a uniform standard of patentability criteria, and that
[Canada] has acted well within its rights under NAFTA to set its own
utility requirement.”133
The Tribunal’s failure to champion national sovereignty has the
potential to trigger a significant chilling effect on other nations that are
considering implementing the very TRIPS flexibilities that this Final
Award fails to protect. Developing countries that may be considering
introducing heightened standards of patentability (for example, to prevent
“evergreening” and speculative patenting) may look to this case as an
example of the expensive consequences that may follow. Although
Canada could afford to bear over CDN $6 million in legal fees over five
years, resource-poor countries may be far less likely to implement TRIPS
flexibilities for fear of incurring crippling legal costs. Disputes
challenging domestic IP decisions are still in their infancy, but these
initial “wins” should not lull countries into complacency. 134 Although no
state has yet had to pay for TRIPS-consistent action, the decisions to date
have left the door open to this possibility, and may have a serious chilling
effect on the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities.135
131. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27.1.
132. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, patent challenges, and
effective market life in pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336–37 (2012) (finding that
patent challenges limit the effectiveness of “evergreening” by branded firms).
133. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 46.
134. Ho, Inside Views, supra note 3.
135. Id. For example, the introduction of plain packaging legislation for tobacco products in
New Zealand was delayed by three years, pending the result of Philip Morris’ investor-state dispute
with Australia over similar legislation. Mei Heron, Govt confident it can send tobacco companies
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Thirdly, the Tribunal did not acknowledge the frivolity of Eli Lilly’s
claims, stating instead, in its allocation of costs, that Eli Lilly’s claims
“were not in any sense frivolous, and [Eli Lilly] pursued them in good
faith.”136 The Tribunal’s unwillingness to strike down allegations of
“expropriation” based on rational and carefully reasoned judicial
decisions invalidating state-granted patents under TRIPS-compliant laws
is a disturbing reflection of the corporate bias of international investment
tribunals.137
Finally, as Sean Flynn has argued, investor-state dispute settlement of
IP claims represents “a rupture in the fabric of international intellectual
property law” which, for the last 130 years, has relied upon state-to-state
dispute settlement due to respect for national sovereignty and the less
litigious nature of inter-governmental relations.138 Canada and Mexico
and the United States as interveners argued that NAFTA does not allow
an ISDS arbitral panel to consider violations of Chapter Seventeen, the
IP chapter, as such disputes are left solely to state-state dispute
settlement.139 Regrettably, the Tribunal never addressed this issue,140
even though Canada, the United States, and Mexico as interveners raised
it.141 By leaving this issue unaddressed, the Tribunal indirectly
contributed to the regime shifting about which scholars James Gathii and
Cynthia Ho are most concerned.142 Rather than leaving the interpretation
of national IP laws principally to a nation’s appellate courts, and the
policing of violations of TRIPS or trade agreement IP chapters to
properly constituted state-state dispute resolution mechanisms, ISDS of
IP-investor claims leaves interpretation of the basic architectures of
packing,
RADIO
NEW
ZEALAND
(Sept.
9,
2016,
6:45
AM),
http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/312892/govt-confident-it-can-send-tobacco-companiespacking.
136. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 455.
137. For a detailed study of corporate bias in an ISDS case, see generally Robin Broad,
Corporate Bias in the World Bank Group's International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes: A Case Study of a Global Mining Corporation Suing El Salvador, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
851 (2014-2015). For a more detailed critique of corporate bias in ISDS, see generally PIA
EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, TYLER AMOS & NICK BUXTON, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE:
HOW ARBITRATORS, LAW FIRMS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
BOOM (Helen Burley ed., Corp. Europe Observatory and the Transnat’l Inst. 2014).
138. Flynn, supra note 11.
139. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 226.
140. The closest the Panel came to addressing this issue was in its initial discussion of its
jurisdiction where it said both that “[a] NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal is not a tribunal of general
jurisdiction with competence to adjudicate claims of breach of other provisions of NAFTA, [and
that] [w]ithout prejudice to this appreciation, the Tribunal notes . . . Section A of NAFTA Chapter
Eleven does not require the Tribunal to ignore other provisions of NAFTA . . . for the purposes of
assessing the claims before it.” Id. at ¶ 101–02.
141. Final Award, supra note 1, at ¶ 226.
142. Gathii & Ho, supra note 10.
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international, regional, and national IP regimes to the whims of threemember private arbitral panels with scant expertise and little fealty to
prior arbitral awards or even to the determinant interpretations of IP trade
rules by authoritative bodies. A built-in bias toward investor prerogatives
and a probable disregard of IP’s balance of interests and of a state’s public
health and human rights obligations will predictably lead both to
significant investor awards and to a chaotic and inconsistent set of IPinvestor rulings that will result in even more regulatory chill.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS: CHILLING EFFECTS REALIZED IN CANADA,
COLOMBIA, AND UKRAINE
The risks of regulatory chill are of course exacerbated by general IPmaximalist pressures from the United States, the European Union, Japan,
Switzerland, and other pro-pharma countries, and by extra-arbitral
pressures relating to specific ISDS claims, such as those described
previously concerning the Eli Lilly v. Canada arbitration.143 In this
regard, three instances of policy reversal based on the actuality or reality
of arbitral claims are readily apparent: (1) the post-Eli Lilly narrowing,
indeed, evisceration of Canada’s promise/utility doctrine in the
AstraZeneca case;144 (2) the retreat from issuing a compulsory license in
Colombia on Novartis’ cancer medicine, including subsequent challenges
to price controls and to the governmental architecture for considering
compulsory licenses; and (3) the deregistration of a competing generic
medicine in Ukraine in response to Gilead’s threat to file an ISDS case
challenging Ukraine’s alleged failure to enforce a data exclusivity rule.
AstraZeneca’s patent, which involves treatment for gastric reflux
disorders,145 was invalidated in lower courts146 pursuant to the
promise/utility doctrine upheld in the Eli Lilly arbitration award.
However, in ruling that AstraZeneca’s patent was not invalid for lack of
utility, Canada’s Supreme Court found that the promise/utility doctrine
misinterprets Canada’s Patent Act by looking beyond the claims and by
requiring the patent applicant to demonstrate or soundly predict all
promises of usefulness made at the time of filing.147
The Supreme Court reviewed the existing promise/utility doctrine,
developed by the Federal Courts’ jurisprudence, as requiring “the
identification of promises based on a review of the entire specification,
143. See supra text accompanying notes 11–20 (discussing generally the impact of the Eli Lilly
decision on past precedent regarding the promise/utility doctrine as laid out in AstraZeneca).
144. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 2017 SCC 36.
145. Id. at ¶ 3.
146. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12–17.
147. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 51.
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i.e. both the claims and disclosure,” even in the absence of claim
ambiguity, and that the promises identified must be supported by
demonstration or sound prediction.148 The Court ruled that this doctrine
was “excessively onerous in two ways: (1) it determines the standard of
utility that is required of a patent by reference to the promises expressed
in the patent; and (2) where there are multiple expressed promises of
utility, it requires that all be fulfilled for a patent to be valid.”149
Noting that the utility requirement is “at the core of this appeal,” the
Supreme Court reasoned that analysis regarding patentability criteria
typically focuses on the claims alone and looks to the patent disclosure
only when there is an ambiguity in the claims.150 “The promise doctrine,
by contrast, directs courts to read both the claims and the disclosure to
identify potential promises, rather than the claims alone, even in an
absence of ambiguity in the claims,”151 the Court said, and this is an
incorrect interpretation of the Patent Act. The Court also justified its
claim-disclosure/utility ruling by distinguishing between disclosure
requirements and the utility criterion.152 While admitting that
“overpromising is a mischief,”153 the Court reasoned that such mischief
should be addressed through disclosure rule consequences under Sections
27(3) and 58 of the Patent Act, rather than Section 2’s utility
requirement.154
Moreover, with respect to multiple claims concerning utility, the Court
opined that the patent application need not provide evidence in support
of all the promised utility claims at the time of filing—even a scintilla of
evidence in support of one promise of utility would be enough, even if
that potential use is never realized.155 “The Promise Doctrine risks, as
was the case here, for an otherwise useful invention to be deprived of
patent protection because not every promised use was sufficiently
demonstrated or soundly predicted by the filing date,” the Court said.156
“Furthermore, such a consequence is antagonistic to the bargain on which
patent law is based, wherein we ask inventors to give fulsome disclosure
in exchange for a limited monopoly.”157
In sum, the revised promise doctrine might best be called the “one
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at ¶ 31.
Id. at ¶ 37.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 38–46.
Id. at ¶ 45.
Id. at ¶ 46.
Id. at ¶ 55.
Id. at ¶ 50.
Id. at ¶ 51.

2017]

The Incredible Shrinking Victory

507

scintilla, maybe” utility doctrine. Patent examiners and Canadian courts,
absent ambiguity, will assess utility only by reference to claims, even if
alternative promises are made in the disclosures. Although “not any use
will do,” any use related to the nature of the subject matter will suffice.158
With respect to any one claimed use, there need be only a scintilla of
utility established either by demonstration or sound prediction as of the
filing date.159 The Court gave assurance that patents will not be granted
where uses are speculative.160 Despite stating that “a scintilla of utility
will do,”161 the Court concluded its articulation of the revised utility
doctrine with this oddly contradictory statement: “Even though utility of
the subject-matter is a requirement of patent validity, a patentee is not
required to disclose the utility of the invention to fulfill the requirements
of s. 2,” concluding instead that the inventor is not obligated in his or her
disclosure of claims to describe in what way the invention is useful.162
The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision drew swift and stunned
reviews.163 One reviewer described the Court as having succumbed to
United States and Big Pharma pressures, both in the Eli Lilly v. Canada
ISDS case and in USTR Special 301 Reports and NAFTA renegotiation
objectives.164 Although it is hard to discern the traces of these pressures
in the text of the decision, two interveners raised objections to the lower
courts’ rulings by arguing that the promise/utility doctrine was discordant

158. Id. at ¶ 53.
159. Id. at ¶ 55.
160. Id. at ¶¶ 56–57.
161. Id. at ¶ 55.
162. Id.at ¶ 58.
163. Baker, supra note 25; see Natalie Olivo, Canadian Justices Balk At ‘Promise Doctrine’ In
Drug
IP
Row,
LAW360
(June
30,
2017,
6:15
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/940288/canadian-justices-balk-at-promise-doctrine-in-drug-iprow (discussing how the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling in AstraZeneca weakened the “promise
doctrine”); see also Ed Silverman, Pharma scores a big win with a Canadian ruling on patent law,
PHARMALOT STAT+ (June 30, 2017) https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/06/30/canadapatents-astrazeneca-nafta/?s_campaign=stat:rss (reviewing the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling
on patent law). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce responded promptly with praise:
We welcome today’s ruling that upholds AstraZeneca’s patent rights and rebuffs
Canada’s so-called promise doctrine. . . . The doctrine’s extremely restrictive approach
has created harmful instability and uncertainty for medical innovators by making it
difficult to obtain or defend a life science patent in Canada. Today, the Supreme Court
has begun to restore much-needed clarity and confidence that biopharmaceutical
innovators will be afforded equal protections under the law. This ruling sends an
important signal that Canada is open for the business of innovation.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Applauds Supreme Court’s
Ruling
on
Canada’s
“Promise
Doctrine”
(June
30,
2017,
11:30
AM),
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-applauds-supreme-court-ruling-canadaspromise-doctrine.
164. Baker, supra note 25.
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with Canada’s international obligations under NAFTA and TRIPS, and
footnote 1 to the opinion referenced the pending Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS
case.165 The interveners’ argument was not addressed by the Court, but it
is obvious that the Supreme Court was aware of the Eli Lilly case and that
it had been decided at the time of its decision.
Two other IP-related investor disputes demonstrate that the
vulnerability of developing countries to investor-state arbitration over
pharmaceutical IPR decisions or policies is far from hypothetical.166
Chronic myeloid leukemia medication, imatinib, marketed as Glivec by
Swiss patent holder Novartis, retails for USD $15,161 per year in
Colombia, nearly double its gross national income per capita.167
Although Novartis holds a monopoly over the drug in Colombia until
2018, the issuance of a compulsory license by the Colombian government
could introduce generic competition and extend the lives of thousands of
patients who cannot afford the treatment at its current price. In November
2014, civil society groups in Colombia168 petitioned the Colombian
Minister of Health, Alejandro Gaviria Uribe, to issue a compulsory
license on Glivec. The Minister’s deliberations, however, were met with
strong international hostility. The Colombian Ministry of Health received
communications from Novartis, the Swiss Confederation,169 and from
U.S. embassy officials (after meeting with the USTR and the Senate
Finance Committee) that alleged violations of international law,
threatened dispute settlement claims, and warned that a compulsory
license on Glivec would jeopardize Colombian interests in the United

165. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 2017 SCC 36 ¶ 21, n.1.
166. Ho, Inside Views, supra note 3.
167. See Background FAQ on Glivec (imatinib) compulsory license in Colombia, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (2016), http://keionline.org/colombia-imatinib-FAQ.
168. These groups include: IFARMA, Misión Salud, and CIMUN. Id.
169. On May 18, 2015, on the margins of the 68th World Health Assembly in Geneva, the Swiss
State Secretary and Director of the Federal Office of Public Health, Pascal Strupler, confronted
Colombia’s Minister of Health, Alejandro Gaviria, in a bilateral meeting and presented
Switzerland’s concerns regarding Colombia’s efforts to reduce the price of Glivec. Following this
meeting, Ambassador Livia Leu, the Swiss Head of Bilateral Economic Relations and Delegate of
the Federal Council for Trade Agreements, wrote to Colombia’s Ministry of Health and Social
Protection explicitly referring to the Novartis patent, and asserted that compulsory licenses were
tantamount to an “expropriation” of the patent owner and would deter future research and
development of innovative medicines that might benefit Colombia. Andrew Goldman & Thiru
Balasubramania, Switzerland pressures Colombia to deny compulsory license on imatinib,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.keionline.org/node/2312.
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States, including funding for the Colombian peace process.170 In April
2016, Novartis filed a notice of dispute under the Colombia-Switzerland
bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), indicating that it would launch an
investor-state dispute against Colombia.171
In a reversal of policy, arguably as a result of the noticed ISDS claim,
in June 2016 Mr. Gaviria issued a Declaration of Public Interest,
compelling the National Price Pharmaceutical Commission (“NPPC”) to
impose price controls on Glivec instead of issuing a compulsory
license.172 In October 2016, the NPPC declared that Glivec would be
subject to a price control of 206 pesos per milligram, a 40 percent
reduction from its current price.173 The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) criticized the decision as a
“harmful global precedent,”174 while the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
urged Colombia to abandon this “destructive” course of action.175
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the price control remains unclear. The
Technical Committee for the Colombian Ministry of Health has
emphasized that price controls cannot match the price reductions
achieved by generic competition.176 Moreover, the price control relies on
170. See Letter from Andrés Flórez, Embassy of Colombia in Washington, D.C., to María
Ángela Holguín, Minister of External Affairs (Apr. 27, 2016) (describing pressure from the U.S.
Senate Finance and the USTR over Colombian efforts to grant a compulsory license on the Novartis
cancer drug Glivec), translated in April 27, 2016 Letter from Colombian Embassy regarding Senate
Finance, USTR pressure on Novartis compulsory license, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 27,
2016), https://www.keionline.org/node/2504. See also Letter from the Embassy of Colombia in
Washington, D.C., to Alejandro Gaviria, Colombian Minister of Health (Apr. 28, 2016) (reporting
on a meeting between embassy officials and Everett Eissenstat, the Chief International Trade
Counsel for the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance), translated in April 28, 2016 letter regarding
US Senate Finance threats over compulsory license on Novartis cancer drug patents, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/node/2505.
171. See Caroline Simson, Novartis Knocks Colombia Over Leukemia Drug Price Control,
LAW360 (Dec. 1, 2016 7:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/868104 (explaining that
Novartis filed a notice of suit against Colombia).
172. Lisa L. Mueller et al., Intellectual Property: Review of Compulsory Licenses in Colombia,
NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/intellectual-propertyreview-compulsory-licenses-colombia.
173. Redaccion Salud, Imatinib, medicamento para tratar el cáncer, costará $206 por
miligramo [Imatinib, a drug to treat cancer, will cost $206 per milligram], EL ESPECTADOR (Oct.
21, 2016 10:44 AM), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/salud/imatinib-medicamento-tratar-elcancer-costara-206-milig-articulo-661514.
174. Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA),
PhRMA Response to Colombia’s Decision to Enforce a Declaration of Public Interest (Sept. 14,
2016), http://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-response-to-colombias-decision-to-enforce-adeclaration-of-public-interest.
175. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Condemns Colombian Health
Minister’s Move Toward Stripping Privately-Held Patents (June 9, 2016 7:15 PM),
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-condemns-colombian-health-minister-smove-toward-stripping-privately-held.
176. According to The Report of the Ministry of Health’s Technical Committee for the Public
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Novartis’ willingness to continue to supply Glivec at the new price, and
there are already indications that it will not.
Throughout this entire process in Colombia, Novartis has played a
leading role in efforts to thwart Colombia’s lawful use of a TRIPScompliant compulsory license or a price-control measure. In addition to
noticing its intent to institute an ISDS case, Novartis challenged
Colombia’s public health/CL declaration, filed two Colombia Supreme
Court challenges to its price-control measures, and recommended altering
Colombia’s Declaration of Public Interest procedures to increase the role
of the Ministry of Trade in such declarations.177 In response to U.S. and
industry pressure, the government of Colombia has apparently decided
that an order to proceed with a Declaration of Public Interest must now
be based on consultations with the Ministry of Trade and the National
Planning Department; in addition, the new policy has eliminated any
option, like price controls, other than a compulsory license to prevent
public interest harm.178
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the threat of an USD $800 million ISDS claim
by U.S. pharmaceutical firm Gilead Sciences, Inc., was effective in
compelling the Ukrainian government to deregister a generic drug in
competition with Gilead’s prohibitively expensive hepatitis C medication
sofosbuvir.179 Unlike in the Canadian and Colombian cases, this ISDS

Interest Declaration:
[P]rices of Glivec, despite being subject to controls, are still very high compared with
generics, which have been progressively leaving the market with the grant of the patent.
Direct price controls . . . will never match the results achieved by competition in the
market. Without a doubt, the best way to reduce prices is competition.
Ministerio de Salud y Proteccion Social Comite Tecnico Declaratoria De Interes Publico
[The Report of the Ministry of Health’s Technical Committee for the Public Interest Declaration]
(Feb. 24, 2016) (on file with author). The price reductions facilitated by the introduction of
generic competition would represent savings of around USD $15 million per year for the
Colombian Ministry of Health). Id.
177. See Compulsory licensing in Colombia: Leaked documents show aggressive lobbying by
Novartis, PUBLIC EYE (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.publiceye.ch/en/media/pressrelease/compulsory_licensing_in_colombia_leaked_documents_show_aggressive_lobbying_by_n
ovartis/ (discussing pharma giants that are threatening Colombia with legal suit); see also Haytham
Hashem, Pharmaceutical Giant Threatens to Drag Government Before Corporate Tribunal for
Trying to Make Essential Cancer Drug Accessible, PUBLIC CITIZEN EYE ON TRADE BLOG (Mar.
24, 2017), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2017/03/ (explaining the legal threats Colombia
is facing for creating an inaccessible market for essential cancer drugs).
178. En Misión Salud, Ministerio de comercio firma decreto que modifica procedimiento de
declaración de interés public [Ministry of Commerce signs decree amending procedure declaration
of public interest] (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.mision-salud.org/actualidad/ministerio-decomercio-firma-decreto-que-modifica-procedimiento-de-declaracion-de-interes-publico/.
179. Luke E. Peterson & Zoe Williams, Gilead Pharma corp withdraws investment arbitration
after Ukraine agrees to settlement of dispute over monopoly rights to market anti-viral drug, ISDS
PLATFORM (Mar. 16, 2017), http://isds.bilaterals.org/?gilead-pharma-corp-withdraws.
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case did not involve patent related issues—instead it rested on a TRIPSplus data exclusivity claim.180 Gilead had not filed a primary patent
application on sofosbuvir, though it had filed a weak secondary patent
that had been challenged repeatedly by civil society organizations in
Ukraine.181 Gilead’s sofosbuvir was registered in Ukraine in mid-2015
and was entitled to data exclusivity protections under Ukrainian law.182
Nonetheless, a rival generic equivalent from an Egyptian manufacturer,
Europharma International, was registered in November 2015.183 Gilead
filed a lawsuit against the government demanding deregistration of the
competing generic, which Gilead lost at the trial court level and thereafter
appealed.184
During the pendency of that lawsuit, Gilead notified Ukraine of the
existence of an investment dispute, believed to have been filed secretly
under the U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Investment Treaty.185 Following the
ISDS threat, the Ukrainian government approved a settlement agreement
with Gilead on January 25, 2017, which promised a discounted price for
sofosbuvir in exchange for the deregistration of the local generic drug,
Grateziano, which was registered by the Ministry of Health in November
2015.186 As a result, Ukraine’s Health Ministry issued an order on
February 22, 2017, to cancel the registration of generic sofosbuvir and
exclude it from the State Register of Medicinal Products of Ukraine in
exchange for a significant price reduction of sofosbuvir to approximately

180. See Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 303, 315–16 (2008) (explaining that Ukraine
adopted data exclusivity in 2011 via Law No. 3998-VI, introducing new rules to the Law of Ukraine
on Pharmaceutical Products No. 123/96-ВР, “3+2+1” DE scheme: three years data exclusivity, two
years market exclusivity, opportunity of prolongation up to one year, in case a new indication is
discovered).
181. See generally Mykyta Trofymenko, Civil society struggle for affordable sofosbuvir in
Ukraine,
DON’T
TRADE
OUR
LIVES
AWAY
BLOG
(Aug.
2016),
https://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/civil-society-struggle-for-affordablesofosbuvir-in-ukraine.pdf (discussing Gilead’s patent applications).
182. Peterson & Williams, supra note 179.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Ukr.U.S.,
Mar.
4,
1994,
S.
TREATY
DOC.
NO.
103-37
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2366 (Art. VI of the U.S.-Ukraine
BIT allows ISDS).
186. Peterson & Williams, supra note 179. Текст документа: “Про підписання Мирової
угоди між Україною та компанією “Гілеад Сайєнсиз, Інк.” № 45-р — редакція від [On the
signing of the Global Agreement between Ukraine and the company “Gilead Sciences, Inc.”], Order
No. 45-p, Jan. 25, 2017, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=249699210 (the
decision regarding this settlement is published on the Ukrainian government website in the
Ukrainian language only).
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USD $750 per course of treatment.187
All three of these cases involve multiple forms of pressure to reverse
lawful use of TRIPS flexibilities. In each instance, pressure exerted
through domestic litigation, backdoor lobbying, and government pressure
from trade partners was supplemented by IP-related pharmaceutical ISDS
claims. In each instance, it is impossible to assert with certainty that ISDS
alone was the catalyst for the government’s reversal of policy. Yet it is
possible to infer that the ISDS cases, pending and even decided, have
been factors leading to policy deterrence. Moreover, in each instance, the
IP-related claims were not made by governments via state-state dispute
settlement, but were instead conceived and initiated by private foreign
companies. In the case of Eli Lilly, one can also trace the evolution of
U.S. Special 301 pressure directly to the earlier filing of an ISDS case.
The United States had not complained about Canada’s promise/utility
doctrine until the case was filed.188
Rather, the Eli Lilly-Canada, Novartis-Colombia, and Gilead-Ukraine
ISDS claims demonstrate that national governments are increasingly
confronting a shrinking domestic policy space, hemmed in by the chilling
effect of investor-state arbitration on domestic health measures.189
Foreign investors can bring IP-based claims against any government
measure that adversely affects corporate profits, prompting arbitrations
challenging a wide range of TRIPS-compliant measures, including robust
patentability standards, plain packaging legislation, 190 and drug price
negotiations. Eli Lilly, Novartis, and Gilead’s decisions to file or threaten

187. See Ukraine Signs Amicable Agreement with U.S. Gilead Biopharmaceutical Producer on
Hepatitis C Drug, INTERFAX-UKRAINE (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://open4business.com.ua/ukraine-signs-amicable-agreement-u-s-gilead-biopharmaceuticalproducer-hepatitis-c-drug/.
188. Ambassador Ronald Kirk, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 2011 SPECIAL
REPORT 301 (Apr. 2011) (The USTR’s 2011 Special 301 Report, although published prior to Eli
Lilly’s launch of the investor-state dispute in November 2012, placed Canada on the Priority Watch
List but contained no reference to the promise/utility doctrine.).
189. Lawrence R. Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The
Contested Evolution of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 311 (Terrence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, New York
City
2015),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6119&context=faculty_scholarship.
190. See Phillip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012–12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015); Tom Miles & Martinne Geller, Australia
wins landmark WTO tobacco packaging case, REUTERS (May 5, 2017) (discussing WTO upholding
an Australian law on restrictive tobacco packing), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wto-tobaccoaustralia-idUSKBN1801S9. Although Australia was ultimately successful in defending its plain
packaging laws in both investor-state arbitrations, these cases have had a significant chilling effect
on plain packaging policies in other countries, particularly those which are unable to afford the
costs of ISDS. See Lukasz Gruszczynski, Australian Plain Packaging Law, International
Litigations and Regulatory Chilling Effect, 5 EUR. J. RISK REG. 242, 243–44 (2014) (explaining
the precedential impact of the Australian tobacco packaging rule).
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to file ISDS claims against the Canadian, Colombian, and Ukrainian
governments reflect the extraordinary power given to corporations to
challenge national sovereignty over both domestic IP policy and health,
and to promote the private arbitration of public interests.
CONCLUSION
The struggle against acquisition, preservation, and extension of
pharmaceutical monopolies is threatened in many fora, though the
common extraneous forces are the combined might of pharmaceutical
multinationals and powerful, affluent governments at their beck and call.
ISDS is a formidable arrow in industry’s quiver, but it is by no means the
sole mechanism by which companies seek to forestall competition that
might make medicines more affordable for all. In Canada’s case, a narrow
and somewhat hollow victory was eviscerated by parallel court
challenges and intense pressure from Canada’s major trading partner, the
United States.
There is something particularly perverse about bypassing domestic
courts and using private arbitration to challenge efforts to limit
monopolies granted by sovereign states. In truly egregious cases of foul
play against foreign investments, one might expect investment treaty
parties to bring claims where success is highly likely. But the extra profits
arising from exclusive rights—in many instances counted in billions of
dollars—give perverse incentives to right-holders to advance spurious
and marginal claims, hoping that at least one pellet in the shotgun blast
will capture the attention of elite lawyers who make a very comfortable
living promoting the expansion of ISDS claims. The growing number of
ISDS cases based on IP claims is troubling indeed, as is their in terrorem
effect.
Proponents of affordable access to life-enhancing and life-saving
medicines must become wilier and better resourced. Although significant
academic and activist attention was paid to the Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS
case, much less was paid to AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc. as it
wound its way through the Canadian courts. Likewise, less attention was
paid to overt and covert pressures that were mounted from abroad against
the promise/utility doctrine and Canada’s temerity to adopt a patentability
criterion less forgiving than the U.S.’s. Even worse, the ISDS IP
blockbuster is playing in multiple venues, making it that much harder for
opponents to fight on various fronts simultaneously. It is for these reasons
that the authors once again recommend that ISDS provisions be removed
or rewritten to prevent the possibility of bringing IP-related claims.191

191. Baker & Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound, supra note 10, at 58–59.

